

Block

3

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

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BLOCK-3 INTRODUCTION

Morals and values are a part of the behavioural aspects of an individual. There is a subtle correlation between the two. Moral is a system of beliefs that is taught for deciding good or bad whereas values are personal beliefs or something that comes from within. Morals have more social value and acceptance than values, therefore a person is judged more for his moral character than the values. Moral is the motivation for leading a good life in right direction whereas value is imbibed within a person, it can be bad or good. This investigation began in ancient philosophy, where it is called axiology or ethics. Early philosophical investigations sought to understand good and evil, and the concept of “the good”. Today much of value theory is scientifically empirical, recording what people do value and attempting to understand why they value it in the context of psychology, sociology, and economics.

Unit-1 Theories of Goodness: analysis the different theories of goodness, meanings of intrinsic and instrumental good, concept of ethical pluralism .While explaining the different theories of goodness, both meta ethical and normative theories of goodness have been touched upon. The differences between two types of good-intrinsic and instrumental good have been delineated.

Unit-2 Theories of Conduct: describes the different theories of human conduct and illustrates the difference between rules and human conduct. Universalizability as a theory of human conduct has been examined according to which human conduct in order to be worthwhile or morally good should be rational or universalizable. Other theories like the theory of rational self interest, general good theory, and utilitarianism theory have also been elaborated upon.

Unit-3 Reason and Emotions in Human Conduct: discusses the dichotomy between reason and emotion and the positive contributions of emotion in morality. The other aspect is judgment vis-à-vis is action in a moral context. In a moral act all three aspects of reason: judging, feeling and psychomotor actions are involved,

Unit-4 Character and Personality: in common parlance are used with a sense of vagueness. The two terms in fact have much in common and it is difficult to distinguish the two. This unit clarifies the meaning especially in the context of ethical human behaviour. The five character personality patterns briefly discussed in this unit are a) amoral b) expedient type c) irrational conscientious, and d) rational altruistic type.

UNIT 1 THEORIES OF GOODNESS

Structure

- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Objectives
- 1.3 What is meant by the term 'Good'?
- 1.4 What kinds of things are Good?
- 1.5 Intrinsic and Instrumental Good
 - 1.5.1 Difference between pleasure and happiness
- 1.6 Hedonism
- 1.7 Ethical Pluralism
 - 1.7.1 Knowledge
 - 1.7.2 Moral Qualities
- 1.8 Self Realization
- 1.9 Let Us Sum Up
- 1.10 Answers to Check Your Progress
- 1.11 References

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Many statements state facts. For example, statements like 'he is a tall man', or 'India is the largest democracy of the world'. However, there are statements which do not just describe facts but also express our judgement. For example, statements like 'stealing is bad' or 'use of atomic bomb is destructive; 'sound mental and physical health is desirable', 'this painting is beautiful' etc, These categories of statements express values we attach to something. In other words, in such statements we are making judgements of value. The value assigned may be aesthetic; viz., as found in sentences like 'this painting is beautiful'; or it may be ethical, viz. 'stealing is bad'. In ethics we are concerned with good and bad; right and wrong; duty and obligation. The word good, which is a matter of central concern in ethics, is also used in aesthetics but in a different sense. Both in aesthetics as well as in ethics the word good used has multiple meanings. In aesthetics it is used, for example, to describe the quality of thing, phenomena or individual, viz. 'He is a good athlete or a good swimmer'. But when we use the word 'good' in moral discussion many problems arise. We use 'good' to describe some one's character or conduct. In a moral context, the meaning of this word may differ.

In this unit, we shall be discussing the different theories of goodness. In this context, we shall also discuss the intrinsic and extrinsic good and also explain hedonism or utilitarian view of goodness.

1.2 OBJECTIVES

Following a study of this unit you should be able to:

- discuss the non-cognitive theory and distinguish it from the naturalistic theory of good;

- clarify the meanings of intrinsic and instrumental good;
- illustrate hedonism as a theory of goodness;
- explain the concept of ethical pluralism;
- critically examine the nature of knowledge, self-realization and moral qualities as bases for ethical pluralism

1.3 WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM ‘GOOD’?

The term good in an ethical context, is interpreted differently by different thinkers. According to one view, called ethical naturalism, the ethical term ‘good’ can be translated into non-ethical without any change in meaning. For example when I say that, it is ‘good’ to help others in need, it means I approve of it. But in such a case, I am not saying anything about the property of the act but rather I am expressing my attitude (of approval) towards it. If we accept such a definition of ‘good’ or right, then no acts are right or wrong, good or bad in themselves. There are only favourable or unfavourable attitudes held by people. In actual practice, people generally follow a reverse procedure. They approve certain acts, because they are good or right, contrarily they are not right, because they have been approved by these people. Approval or non-approval of certain act, expresses only attitudes of favourableness or unfavourableness. It is not a condition of goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness. Even if people approve certain acts as good or right, it does not follow that the right act is necessarily right. The majority’s view may be mistaken.

According to the utilitarian view, any act is good if it promotes or tends to promote maximum happiness to the maximum number of people in the long run. The utilitarian definition has however some merit, because it attempts to define in terms of the consequences it produces. One essential feature of consequentialism or teleological theories is that it gives good priority over the right. The term good is defined as the end or the objective of human action: “greatest happiness of greatest number”. This view evaluates moral actions in terms of whether they contribute to the good. The results/consequences determine the rightness or wrongness of actions.

There are other deontological theories, which argue the priority of the right over the good. Actions are intrinsically right or wrong without any regard to the consequences they happen to produce. In short, certain actions are intrinsically good or bad, right or wrong. Their goodness or badness does not depend on the consequences they produce. For example, if I perform my duty with sincerity I should not bother about what might be the consequences.

1.4 WHAT KINDS OF THINGS ARE GOOD?

In this unit, we shall focus on the question “what kinds of things are good”? In this regard at least one thing is certain. And this is that there would be no judgements about what is good and bad, if people do not value certain things above others. In the simplest sense, one values something if she/he likes or she/he prefers it to something else.

The word value can be interpreted in another sense also. Something may be of value to someone even though one does not prefer it. For example, one’s health

may be of value to him/her, even though she/he acts in such a way as to undermine or destroy it. Studying is of value to students, though some students' preference is not studying. Whatever is of value to you in the attainment of goal is not necessary what you prefer. That which one values (subjectively) is one thing, and that which is of value (objectively) is another. So value is considered in two senses: (i) a liking or a preference, and (ii) that which promotes a goal independently of one's liking or preference.

Secondly, things which are of value in a particular context may vary from one individual to another. Now the question is: are all such things valuable in themselves? Some things are valuable as *means* to attainment of certain other things – that is, they are means to some ends. Proper or balanced diet is a means to good health. Health may be valuable to attainment of something like happiness or peace of mind. So in the objective sense, value is the means to some end (as a necessary condition). Here again a question arises- are there things which are of value in themselves regardless of what we are aiming at? or is it always relative to some end - that which has value or worth in itself without reference to any end or that which has value as a means to the attainment of an end. Some philosophers have answered this question in the affirmative i.e., there are things which are valuable in themselves and also there are things which are valuable as means to some further end. These two concepts are more clearly discussed as under.

1.5 INTRINSIC AND INSTRUMENTAL GOOD

Something in this world are valuable, desirable, worthwhile, i.e. good for their own sake, whereas other things are good only as means to some ends. They are security, peace, pleasure, money, enjoyment, happiness, knowledge, honesty, kindness, intelligence, affection, beauty, etc. which are worth having or desirable. But some of these are desirable for their own sake and others are means to something that are desirable for their own sake. For example, money is good only as a means to some other things like material comfort, freedom from certain fears, happiness and peace. But are all these things that money brings worth having for their own sake. Surely no. Then, why do we want these things? Perhaps, to bring happiness, that is something that we desire for its own sake. Happiness is intrinsically good. Thus intrinsic value is the ethical thing that an object has in itself or for its own sake. An object with intrinsic value may be regarded as an end or end-in-itself. It is contrasted with instrumental value (or extrinsic value), the value of which depends on how much it generates intrinsic value.

1.5.1 Difference between Pleasure and Happiness

What is the difference between these two terms? Pleasure is a certain kind of consciousness (not verbally definable), a psychological state, with which we are all acquainted from our experiences. We speak of pleasure of eating, drinking, sexual experience, taking a walk in the morning, reading a book, contemplating works of arts, listening to music, engaging in conversation with friends etc. All these things are sources of pleasure. Pleasure may be physical such as eating, drinking, sexual experience or it may be mental and spiritual.

Happiness and pleasure are not synonymous terms. We may experience pleasure for a few seconds but it would be strange to speak of being happy for a few seconds.

The relation of pleasure and happiness is like that of part and the whole; happiness consists of the sum of pleasures. A person may experience numerous pleasures without being happy; but she/he cannot be happy without experiencing pleasure from some source or other. Sources of pleasure, of course, count much more towards happiness than do others. One's healthy attitude towards life and cheerful disposition are much more conducive to happiness than striving for wealth and glamour.

1.6 HEDONISM

Hedonism as a normative ethical philosophy means that pleasure and happiness constitute ultimate good. In other words it can be said that something is normally good or right if it promotes or tends to promote maximum happiness to the maximum number of people in the long run. According to the philosophy of hedonism, only that pleasure is intrinsically good – that is, worth having for its own sake. On the basis of this theory, the more pleasure and happiness are in the world, the better it is. Life containing the most intrinsic good is the one that contains maximum pleasure and the least displeasure.

According to the hedonist, pleasure and happiness are intrinsically good. There are many things that the hedonist would consider good, but only pleasure and happiness are considered intrinsically good. For example works of Art are good in that they provide the possibility of pleasant aesthetic experiences. They are sometimes said to have a special kind of inherent value, since the contemplation of them is itself pleasant. Bricks and mortar, by contrast do not have inherent value, because the very contemplation of them is not itself pleasant. They have instrumental value, in that they have a utility for human purpose, such as building houses; which in turn lead to happiness. Anything that is usable for furtherance of happiness is instrumentally good.

Among the things that are instrumentally good (in the hedonistic sense) are moral qualities or virtues—honesty, benevolence, truth, non-stealing, industriousness and so on. In general, moral qualities are those that tend to make one and all better human beings; though it is difficult to make a sharp distinction between moral and non-moral qualities. For example, can we treat thrift, tidiness courage etc. as moral qualities? Courage, for example, may not be good in itself, but only when it leads to happiness in the world, its moral value is increased. Similar is the case with honesty. It is good, but not good in itself. Acquisition of knowledge is in general, good, but it can also be evil depending upon the purpose for which it is used. In any case when it is good, its goodness is only instrumental – knowledge that adds to the sum of happiness is good. Knowledge of the principles of physics is of enormous value in human life, yet hydrogen and other atomic bombs are also made with its knowledge, which can annihilate human life from the globe. Happiness also is not good without conditions, happiness of a criminal who gets away with his crime or of person who wins a contest by cheating do not involve anything good.

Check Your Progress 1

(i) What is utilitarian view of good?

.....
.....

(ii) What is hedonism?

.....

1.7 ETHICAL PLURALISM

We have seen that according to hedonism, pleasure or happiness is intrinsically good. Other thinkers who are critical of hedonism also don't deny this view, but at the same time they accept other things also as intrinsically good. Let us discuss these also.

1.7.1 Knowledge

There is no doubt that knowledge is good, knowledge is power and it is an instrument in the advancement of human civilization. It is also used as an instrument of human happiness and pleasure. If you know that certain disease is contagious, you can avoid getting exposed to it by taking precautions. Notwithstanding, the instrumental use of knowledge, it is claimed to be good for its own sake. We study philosophy, mathematics, or any other subject like physics or biology to acquire knowledge and not with the objective that this knowledge will add to world's happiness.

Many people including the hedonists are not convinced about the argument about knowledge for its intrinsic worth. They say that though it is good to have knowledge, its value is instrumental and not inherent like happiness or liberty. Arguing against knowledge as inherent good, they hold that when knowledge is good, it is only instrumentally good and also not under all circumstances. There are many cases where true knowledge is concealed from persons (suffering from diseases) to save them from frustration, anguish or anxiety. And there are conditions/ circumstances in which knowledge far from being an intrinsic value is not a value at all. So according to hedonism it is happiness, which is intrinsically good and not knowledge. The goodness of knowledge depends on its happiness potential.

1.7.2 Moral Qualities

Against the hedonistic view proclaiming that it is happiness alone, that is intrinsically good, the pluralists posit a number of moral qualities of human beings as having intrinsic worth. According to them qualities like kindness, honesty, truthfulness, benevolence, loyalty, generosity, goodwill etc. are valuable in themselves. But the hedonists' arguments against the intrinsic worth of such qualities comment that such qualities are valuable only as means to bring more happiness in the world and hence their values are instrumental. Indeed all these qualities can be used for either good or evil. They are not always instrumentally good. Loyalty, honesty and generosity are evil when used for a bad cause as exemplified by fanatics' loyalty to their party and ready to slaughter thousands of people rather than give up their beliefs. A person who is generous to lazy people, his generosity shown will add more to their laziness. Similarly, if a doctor tells truth to a patient who suffers from some incurable disease it will do more harm to the patient than good.

The pluralists however attach intrinsic values to these qualities even when they have bad consequences. For them, values are more important than the happiness they cause. The hedonist's counterargument is that though a world without moral virtues is not worth living, still their values are instrumental. If virtues are deleted from the goal of happiness in which the instrumental values reside, then one is faced with questions like: what are all these virtues for? Why cultivate them at all? What end do they serve?

The pluralists are of the view that happiness obtained by wrongful means, cannot be sustained for long. On the other hand happiness achieved by exercise of moral qualities, is abiding, deep and more self-satisfying. The exercise of desirable human traits is not merely an instrument for the achievement of greater human happiness, these traits are desirable in themselves and people usually value them for themselves. The more, kindness, fairness, generosity, goodwill, wisdom etc. prevail in the world, the better becomes the place. The exercise of moral virtues is thus not merely instrumental to the achievement of happiness, but has a value of its own, independent of its happiness-potential.

1.8 SELF-REALIZATION

The term self realization has been used to indicate two kinds of growth in awareness, of expansion of consciousness, which although more or less related, are different in their nature and have quite different manifestations. The meaning most frequently given to self-realization is that of psychological growth and maturation, of the awakening and manifestation of latent potentialities of the human being- for instance, ethical, aesthetic, and religious experiences and activities. These correspond to the characteristics Maslow (1959) ascribes to self- actualization, and it would perhaps be well to use this term in order to distinguish it from the second kind of self- realization. This is the realization of the self, the experience and awareness of the synthesizing spiritual centre. It is not the realization of the personal conscious self or "I", which should be considered merely as the reflection of the spiritual self, in the field of the personality. Self- actualization may be achieved at different levels and does not necessarily include what can be called the spiritual level.

According to the view of the proponents of self-realization, the only thing that is good for its own sake, is the development of man's best capacities as human beings. Man is endowed with different capacities, proper realization of which lead to full human development. Man is often unable to realize these to the full; as a result most of these, which could have added to his/her human growth, remain underdeveloped. It should be remembered that man possesses both human and animal instincts/potentialities. When we refer to self-realization, we mean human qualities and capacities mentioned above under the section "moral qualities" like generosity, truth, non-violence, physical, moral and intellectual abilities and skills etc. Aristotle speaking on such qualities had opined that exercising one's best capacities meant exercising the capacity that is unique to man and the rational faculty or reason. Man shares many of his capacities for growth with animals but capacities like reason and morality are such faculties that he shares with no other species. It is such unique faculties that should be realized. The biological capacities are to be realized along with the uniquely human faculties but they should be subordinated to capacities like reason and morality. Man's reason should control all his other capacities and capabilities. There is no doubt that man has a right to his self-existence like all

other animals. All living species except man are programmed by nature to perform actions required for their survival. It is man alone, who has capacities to choose a value/action that he thinks is appropriate to his survival. Choosing a code of values is uniquely human.

Man's life is based on the code of ethics. But for individual man, his own life is his purpose. Thus, in this system of ethics, man's life is the ultimate value that all other values serve including happiness. This is the one thing that is an end in itself. But a question arises; will it be wrong for a man ever to risk his life? Not at all. For instance, if a man is compelled to live in such human conditions where freedom of thought and actions are suppressed he might very well risk his life to escape such conditions.

A more recent doctrine, close in some respects to self-realization is contained in the ethical theory given by philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand. According to this view, good is that which is proper (appropriate, conducive) to the life of man as a rational being. Ayn Rand's ethics begins by analysis of the term value. She maintains, values arise from and are necessitated by the distinctive nature of living beings. Value is that which one prefers and is an object of action, which presupposes alternatives. You value an object or thing, which you prefer and choose from alternatives for which action is necessary. If you reflect upon different alternatives, you will see that the most fundamental alternative in the universe is existence or non-existence, the issue of life or death. It is the concept of life that makes the concept of other values possible. It is only to a living person that things can be good or evil. Thus it is existence, nature and the needs of living organisms that make the existence of values possible and necessary.

Man is not born with automatic, innate knowledge of what is good or evil for him. To acquire this knowledge, man must think and to think is an act of choice. That is, if man is to live, he must choose to think and hold life as his standard of value. The code of values that his life requires is a code of ethics.

Check Your Progress 2

(i) Name the instruments of ethical pluralism?

.....

(ii) What is self- realization?

.....

(iii) What is the pluralist's view of happiness?

.....

1.9 LET US SUM UP

In this unit, we have discussed that the word "good" is used in different respects. In whatever sense we use it, the word describes the judgement of values like aesthetic,

moral (ethical) etc. In ethics we are concerned with matters of good and bad, right or wrong, duty and obligation. In this unit, we have analyzed the different theories that aim at clarifying the meaning of good. In doing so, we briefly touch upon both meta ethical and normative theories of 'good' and goodness.

In delineating the meta-ethical theories, i.e., theories relating to classifying meaning of the term good, we dealt with ethical naturalism, according to which ethical sentences can be translated into non-ethical ones without any change in meaning. For example, when I say that this action is right or good, it means I approve of it; or if this action is right it means that it promotes maximum happiness among the maximum number of people.

In addition to ethical naturalism, the non-cognitive view or the emotive theory of good and bad, right or wrong have also been analyzed. According to this view, ethical sentences express speaker's feelings and have nothing to do with rightness or wrongness. While discussing the normative theories, the difference between two types of good- intrinsic good and instrumental good have been emphasized upon. Hedonism and its characteristics have been reflected. Besides these, ethical pluralism which mentions that there are many things that are good for their own sake like *knowledge*, certain moral qualities like good will, loyalty, benevolence, sincerity, etc. have been referred to. While dealing with each of the theories the critical examination of the same from the point of view of their strengths and weaknesses have also been done.

1.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- (i) According to this view any act is good or right if it promotes or tends to promote maximum happiness to the maximum number of people in the long run.
- (ii) Hedonism refers to normative ethical philosophy according to which pleasure and happiness constitute the ultimate good. Hedonism believes that only such a pleasure is intrinsically good that is worth having for its own sake.

Check Your Progress 2

- (i) Knowledge and Moral qualities are the instruments of ethical pluralism.
- (ii) Self-realization is the development of man's best capacities as human beings. Self realization refers to human qualities like generosity, truth, non-violence, moral and physical abilities and skills etc.
- (iii) The pluralists are of the view that happiness obtained by wrongful means, cannot be sustained for long. On the other hand happiness achieved by exercise of moral qualities, is abiding, deep and more self-satisfying

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UNIT 2 THEORIES OF CONDUCT

Structure

- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Objectives
- 2.3 Rules and Principles of Human Conduct
- 2.4 Theories of Conduct
 - 2.4.1 Universalizability
 - 2.4.1.1 Rationality and Morality
 - 2.4.2 Ethical Egoism
 - 2.4.2.1 Epicureanism
 - 2.4.2.2 Rational Self Interest
 - 2.4.3 The General Good Theory
 - 2.4.4 Rule Utilitarianism
 - 2.4.5 Theories of Conduct not based on consequences
- 2.5 Let Us Sum Up
- 2.6 Answers to Check Your Progress
- 2.7 References

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous Unit: “Theories Of Goodness” we discussed the meaning of ethical terms like good and bad, right and wrong. We also discussed normative ethics, which concerns with what things or actions are good. In this context, the utilitarian view (that pleasure and happiness are good in themselves) was examined.

While explaining the nature of what is good, some people tried to associate it with some natural quality of the object or situation which we call good, whereas for others, ethical terms are non-definable, like yellow or pleasure. In addition, we discussed the concept of intrinsic and extrinsic good, as also ethical pluralism. In this unit, we shall try to understand some theories of good human conduct.

2.2 OBJECTIVES

Following a study of this unit you should be able to:

- illustrate the difference between rules and principles of human conduct;
- describe theories of conduct;
- distinguish between “form” and “content” of human behaviour;
- define a truly rational behaviour;
- differentiate between *act- utilitarianism* and *rule-utilitarianism*; and
- explain the structure of theories of conduct

2.3 RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN CONDUCT

While deciding in what way we should act in a given situation involving moral choice, we usually follow certain rules of conduct, which are approved by the culture we live in. For example we follow rules such as those given as under:

- Never take a human life
- Never cause needless pain and suffering to others
- Don't engage in sexual activity outside marriage
- Always turn the other cheek when you have been injured on one cheek
- Don't steal
- Always honour your parents
- Never tell a lie, etc.

A reflection will show that none of the above-mentioned rules is a complete guide to human conduct. These rules tell you what to do, but they do not tell why we should follow them. What we need to know is a moral principle or a set of moral principles from which such rules follow. We need to understand general principles of conduct, which prescribe what one should do in all circumstances. There are several theories of conduct that attempt to state such principles from which certain rules of conduct would follow as special cases. Some of such theories have been discussed in the following sections.

2.4 THEORIES OF CONDUCT

2.4.1 Universalizability

In its simplest form, universalizability means that in behaving with others, you should act in such a way that the rule of your action becomes a universal law. A similar precept of ethics is contained in the Golden rule of Christianity. "Do unto others as you would have them done unto you." It implies that if you want to be fairly treated by others, you should always treat others fairly. If you want others to help you when you are in trouble, you should always help others when they are in need of your help. The intent of this theory is to make no exception: don't expect a kind of special treatment from others, if you are not ready to give similar treatment to them. In other words, it is a rule of impartiality and reciprocity. Nevertheless, such a rule of impartiality, does not tell you what is right or wrong. It just tells you that if certain conduct is wrong for others to do it is also wrong for you to do, provided the circumstances in both the cases are sufficiently similar, or similar in relevant aspects.

The Categorical Imperative: Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, while working on moral principles set forth certain moral principles, which one can unconditionally follow. These principles are called the *categorical imperatives*, i.e. principles that one ought to always follow. One such imperative, which is similar to the Golden Rule of Christianity, is stated here: *So act that you could wish the maxim of your action to become a universal law of human conduct.* If, for sample, you

decide to break a promise or an agreement, because it is no longer convenient or relevant for you to keep it; the maxim of your action is: *Break an agreement or a promise, if it is no longer convenient or relevant*". Yet a more positive maxim, which is more desirable to universalise, may be. "You should help others when they are in trouble." Another possible maxim may be. "Because I don't help others and leave them alone, when they are in trouble, they need not help me, and may leave me alone, when I am in trouble. Both these maxims are possible but the categorical imperative does not tell us which rule we should follow. The requirement of impartiality, however, is compatible with both of these. We can hold that the principle of impartiality is undoubtedly a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient condition.

2.4.1.1 Rationality and Morality

To remedy the situation, we have just discussed, Hegel who held that for behaviour to be called morally good or desirable, it must of necessity be rational. While defining rationality of behaviour in the context of moral conduct, Hegel defined it in terms of (i) logical coherence or consistency; (ii) generation of universals; (iii) empirical evidence in support of the generalization, and (iv) public intelligibility.

According to the first condition of rationality, it is necessary that a set of moral beliefs or rules that we follow should be internally consistent. It is, for example, not rational for me to believe that others should cooperate with me or should take care of any interest, at the same time accept that I must respect other's interests. On the other hand it will be equally consistent or coherent if I believe that others need not respect my interest, just as I don't respect theirs. Many people in this world live life according to the latter principle. We may not like their values, but we can't call them inconsistent, incoherent or irrational.

The second condition/criterion of rationality is concerned with generation of universals or with general principles. According to this condition, I must not own a principle today and another tomorrow, unless these are cogent reasons for such a change. The idea of rational morality entails that our behaviour should be in accordance with certain principles always unless these are valid reasons.

The third condition necessitates empirical evidence or good reasons for what we do. That is, behaviour for which no valid reason or empirical evidence can be put forth, is not a rational behaviour.

According to fourth condition, to be truly rational, our behaviour should be publicly intelligible or acceptable. Use of idiosyncratic reasons, which are peculiarly personal, cannot designate behaviour to be rational. For example use of defence mechanism viz. rationalization—wherein the individual employing reasons which are not true, to justify one's behaviour, is not rationality but only rationalization. Such reasons are not publicly intelligible because they are false.

Nevertheless we must remember that rationality of behaviour provides only the "form" or the "language of morality", not its content or literature of it. That is, it cannot provide us a set of moral principles that we need to follow in our lives. It simply states that whatever moral principle we follow should satisfy the four criteria/conditions of rationality.

2.4.2 Ethical Egoism

To answer the question, “what rule should guide our conduct” the ethical egoist considers one’s own long-term advantage as the guiding principle; the promotion of one’s long-term advantage is what one should aim at. People may differ about what course of action is to be taken for the long term advantage, but once it is clearly known that a certain course of action will serve one’s long term interest more than any other, it is chosen. Under the concept of ethical egoism, at least, two shades of meanings have been associated by different thinkers from time to time. These are: *epicureanism* and *rational self-interest*. These have been described below:

2.4.2.1 Epicureanism

In ancient times the principal exponents of ethical egoism were the Greek epicureans, who held that one should live one’s life in such a way so as to get more pleasure in life, because pleasure for them is the sole ‘good’. In Indian culture also (in the ancient past) there was a school of thought called “*Charvak*” which almost had the same philosophy of life. This hedonistic school of Indian philosophy, is now obsolete at the conceptual level. According to proponents of “*Charvak*” *the summum bonum* (the ultimate good) is the immediate personal gratification and happiness or pleasure. The past is gone and the future never comes. Every moment is a present moment and must be enjoyed to its full. By living unhappy life, we cannot even think of a happy future.

Unlike the Charvaks, however, the epicureans had definite ideas about how each person’s maximum pleasure could be achieved. According to them one should not indulge in excessive food and drink or in personal relations. One should eat and drink what is necessary for maintenance of life, because any excessive indulgence will cause disturbance to one’s health, which is bound to result in unhappiness. Similarly, close relationship may result in heartbreaks when there is betrayal. Hence, one should not become attached to any thing – whether material or personal – that one is likely to lose and is outside one’s control. One should live life in a detached manner. Indeed, the epicurean ethics is not so much a formula for achieving pleasure as for avoiding displeasure. One could hold that a life of involvement in human affairs and personal relationships result in more unhappiness than a life of calm withdrawal and disinterested observation.

Check Your Progress 1

(i) What is Hegelian concept of Rationality?

.....

(ii) What is Epicureanism?

.....

2.4.2.2 Rational Self-Interest

Ayn Rand’s ethics (2007) states that the standard by which one judges what is good or evil, is man’s life—that which is required for man’s survival as man. She

also maintained that man is an end in himself. So man's moral purpose is the achievement of own rational self-interest. In social relations man should neither sacrifice himself for others, nor sacrifice others for himself. His rationality demands that just as one has a right to his/her ontological freedom, others do have such a right.

In order to understand Rand's doctrine of self-interest, one must consider the theory of human rights that is basic to her ethics. Each man possesses certain basic rights by virtue of his nature, as a rational being. Thus, he has a right to further his life by his own thought and effort; he has a right to work, right to property, right to choose his own values and pursue them. He has a right to liberty and pursuit of happiness. All these rights are required for living his life as a rational being but he has no right to encroach upon similar rights of others, viz. he has no right to murder, rob or enslave other men.

Human beings may not only enjoy rights but also carry out their obligations towards others. Such obligations for example may arise, if one has made a contractual agreement one is morally bound to keep; similarly, one is morally bound to support one's children as they are his/her responsibility. However, right to life does not mean that others must provide you with the necessities of life. They have no such obligation towards you and forcing them to do so, will be a violation of their rights. Nothing can be called a right that requires for its implementation the non-voluntary participation of other human beings.

Rational self-interest does not mean that you are free to do anything that serves your interests, especially that which violates others' rights. Rather, it consists of respecting rights of others and demanding that one's own rights be respected.

Second, along with rights, one has obligations towards those situations, which have been caused with his/her participation, but there would be no obligation for those situations which he/she did not cause.

2.4.3 The General Good Theory

To the question of human conduct one answer is given by utilitarianism, which has been discussed above. The answer is very simple: act so as to bring about the greatest good possible. Among the alternative actions available, one should choose the one that produces the maximum total good or the one that has the best total consequences. If, for example, you are aiming at producing happiness, then your act should be such as to create happiness for all. There is no doubt that exact calculations in this regard, may be difficult but we can have good approximation. Sometimes, it is difficult or even impossible to know which alternative will be the one, which can cause maximum happiness or lessen the maximum unhappiness. In such situations one should utilise the best information available at that time. Suppose one's father and a famous physician are trapped in a burning house and one has an alternative to save only one. The utilitarian's answer would be to save the physician, because if s/he is saved, he/she can save the life of some more people. Hence, more good would be done by saving the physician.

It may happen that in spite of one's best judgement or intention his/her act may harm others. Suppose some one driving a car, takes along a person and the car meets with an accident and the person dies. In such case, to say that death of the person would not have occurred, had he not been helped. Can the act of helping here be treated as wrong?

The utilitarian ethics can be stated very simply. The proposition that a certain act is right follows as a conclusion from the following two premises:

- 1) The act that will produce (on the basis of evidence available at the time) the greatest total good is right. This act will produce the greatest total good. Therefore, this act is right.
- 2) The second premise is that the consequence of an act is often difficult or even impossible to determine. This is because; the relation between the cause and effect is extremely complex. What may happen, one never knows for certain.

Nevertheless, utilitarianism has been challenged by philosophers in many ways. Let us consider some examples:

- (1) Suppose I make a promise to provide some services to you. Should I keep the promise only when I believe that doing so, will produce the most good? Should I keep the promise because I made it? Suppose I as a doctor make a promise to meet you at 4 p.m. and just as I was getting ready to see you, an emergency case came which called for an immediate operation; avoiding which could cause fatal death to the patient. Obviously not keeping the promise in such a situation would be the right thing.
- (2) This becomes especially pressing in cases of promises made that no one knew. For example say two explorers are lost in the arctic and there is enough food to keep only one of them alive. The first explorer expresses his willingness to die if the second makes a promise to rear up his children on his friend's behalf. Will the second man be justified, when he returns home and declares the fact. No one would ever know that the promise was made. Since the friend cannot afford to educate or rear up both the families, his first duty would be to rear up his own children and to forget about the promise to the dying man.
- (3) A man ordinarily feels obliged to provide for one's own family and not his neighbour's family. What, if however, on a given occasion, he could do more good by helping the neighbour's family than by helping his own. Should he do it? Would he be equally obliged to do it as to help his own?
- (4) There is a habitual criminal. On several occasions he is brought to the court for conviction. But in the absence of proper evidence, every time, the criminal is set free. Suppose now for an alleged crime, he finally obtains a conviction. The judge comes upon definite information that the person has not committed the crime for which he is convicted. The fact that the person is innocent, this time, is known only to the judge and nobody else. What should the judge do, knowing fully well that if he is released he would commit crimes once again? It would be better for all if he is convicted because if he is released he would commit more crimes and be a danger to the life and property of many. However by being convicted this time, he would be paying for the crime that he has not committed at all.

2.4.4 Rule-utilitarianism

So far we have been discussing the traditional version of utilitarianism, according to which one should perform only the act, which has the best consequences. This traditional version is also known by the name *act-utilitarianism*. If we adopt this version for deciding the rightness of individual acts, there will be many cases, like the ones,

cited above (examples 1 to 4). Judging the worth of an act in terms of consequences of the individual act will either be not possible or it would result in a state of moral dilemma. To come out of this difficult situation, rule-utilitarianism version of utilitarianism has been adopted. It holds that we should not judge the rightness of an act by its consequences, but by the consequences of adopting the rule under which the particular act falls. For example, one important rule in law is that a person, who is known to be innocent, should never be found guilty (see example 4 above). Sustaining the conviction of the man, even after we know that he is innocent would clearly violate this rule. Whatever be the consequences for this particular conviction, the consequences of adopting any rule that permits conviction of someone who is innocent is very bad indeed. But again a question may be raised, “how do we assess the goodness or worth of the rule itself?” Consider the consequences of not having such a rule, and you can easily assess the worth of the rule.

Finding the best rule (a rule whose adoption would have the best consequence) is often difficult. Mostly such rules will not be simple but complex.

For example, can we adopt the rule “Never take a human life” or “Never kill a person”? In that case, what about killing in self-defence? In a battle killing is considered to be good. The adoption of such a rule would result in the death of innocent and survival of thieves and murderers. A better rule in this regard could be “Never initiate aggression against other human beings” or “never kill except in self-defence”. The point is that, adopt the best rule and stick to it without any exception. The best rule is that rule whose adoption results in the best consequences.

Similarly, another example may be “Never break a promise”. This rule can be modified as never break a promise unless it was made in duress, or unless some significantly good result would be achieved or evil prevented by breaking it.

2.4.5 Theories of Conduct not based on consequences

According to utilitarianism, act-utilitarianism or rule-utilitarianism, what we should do and what we should not depends on the consequences. But do we think that every theory of human conduct depends only on the consequences of the act or of the rule. Are there no “right-making” features of the act? There are thinkers who hold that some acts may be good (or bad) independent of the consequences of these acts. We should, therefore, consider not only the consequences (which lie in the future) but also the conditions under which the act was performed (which lie in the past).

Following this line of thought, we can consider various types of *moral obligations* that the utilitarian does not sufficiently recognize.

These are:

- (1) There are duties of gratitude to those who have helped us. For example, I owe a duty of gratitude to my parents but not to the physician as mentioned in an example (given earlier) and to all those who have helped us in need. It is, therefore, ‘father’ rather than the physician whom the son may rescue from the burning building. This duty is not based on probable future looking. Duties have personal character because of the special relations between those involved.
- (2) There are duties of fidelity, loyalty. I have made a promise. I must keep it except in situations where a bigger duty, more urgent and significant comes in the way.

This duty is also past looking (for a past event/relation) and not based on probable consequences of keeping the promise. It is also personal, for the person to whom I made the promise, not just for any one.

- (3) There are duties related to justice. In one sense, justice means equitable treatment to all, not equal treatment. It depends on the “deservedness.” If a judge, for example, sentences a stranger for full penalty but lets off another person for exactly the same offence,(for political or other reasons) injustice is done. But if a school provides freeship, books and clothes to those students only who are poor but performers and not to others, who are well off or who do not perform well, it may be called justice (This is called social justice). Showing partiality is a clear example of injustice. If a judge sentences life imprisonment to every one including himself (if he later commits such an offence) for violating minor traffic rules, the judge is doing injustice, not because he is partial in the deliverance of judgement (that he is certainly not) but because the nature of offence is not so severe as to sentence people for life imprisonment. A man deserves punishment because he has committed an offence, but the same should be proportionate to the offence committed.

The utilitarianism theory of punishment is entirely future looking: one should punish *in-order-to*, not *because-of*. According to utilitarianism, punishment is justified because it may (a) improve the offender, perhaps “teach him a lesson”, so that he will not repeat his offence in future; (b) deter other people from doing similar offences; and (c) protect the people (potential victims) from such offenders by isolating them from the rest of the society. The retributive view of punishment is that, it should be administered simply because an offence has been committed, for which the offender deserves to be punished.

Let us take the case cited in example (5), where in a habitual criminal has been sentenced for a crime which he did not commit this time, though in the past he has committed many crimes but in the absence of evidence, he could not be sentenced. The retribution would signify that the man should not be punished for the offence he has not committed. To punish him would be a clear example of injustice. He should not be punished even though the consequences of punishing him, in such a case might be very good for the society, deserving for the act committed and not by future consequences of punishing. The theorist of rule-utilitarianism would say that he should not be punished. He would say that if an innocent man is punished the consequences of such a rule would be disastrous for the society. It will make everyone feel insecure and also undermine the foundations of law. Both these parties (retributivist as well as rule-utilitarianism) would agree on the issue, though for different reasons.

The retributivist has good reasons for criticizing and condemning the rule-utilitarianism in such cases. The fact is that man is innocent and this alone is sufficient to justify that the man should not be punished. He should not be punished in any circumstance, not even to stop a crime or a riot.

Check Your Progress 2

- (i) What is the General Good Theory?

.....

(ii) What is Utilitarianism theory of Punishment?
.....
.....

2.5 LET US SUM UP

In the present unit we have discussed different theories of human conduct. To start with we examined universalizability as a theory of human conduct. According to this theory, human conduct in order to be worthwhile or morally good should be rational or universalizable. In this process, we distinguished between “form” and “content of morality”. The highest form of universalizable behaviour is defined by Kant in his categorical imperative. Further we discussed ethical egoism, according to which promotion of one’s own long-term interest or advantage should guide one’s behaviour and conduct. As a modified form of this, the theory of rational self-interest has been discussed. This theory is based on the objective requirements of one’s life as a rational being.

To the question of human conduct, another answer is given by the general good theory. This emphasized that it is not one’s own good but good of the society or humanity which should be the aim or consequence of our conduct. However, this theory is not free from pitfalls. To overcome these drawbacks of the act of utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism theory came into existence. This theory holds that we should not judge the consequences of the rightness of the act by its consequences but by the consequences of adopting the rule under which the particular act falls. This theory tried to solve the problem of ethical relativism.

Then, we discussed the theories of conduct not based on consequences of performing the act. Under such theories various types of moral obligations have been considered, which the utilitarian theories did not sufficiently recognize. Under these we discussed various types of duties: gratitude, fidelity and justice.

2.6 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- (i) Hegel held that for behaviour to be called morally good or desirable must of necessity be rational. Hegel defines rationality in terms of i) logical coherence or consistency 2) generation of universals 3) empirical evidence in support of generalization and 4) public intelligibility.
- ii) In ancient times the principal exponents were the Greek Epicureans who held that one should live one’s life in such a way as to get more pleasures in life, because pleasure for them is the sole ‘good’.

Check Your Progress 2

- i) This theory believes in producing the maximum total good or the one that has the best total consequences. Eg: If you are aiming at producing happiness then your act should be such as to create happiness for all.

- ii) The utilitarianism theory of punishment is entirely future looking, one should punish in-order-to and not 'because of'. According to utilitarianism, punishment is justified because it may a) improve the offender by teaching him a lesson B) deter other people from doing similar offences C) protect the people from such offenders by violating them from the rest of the society.

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UNIT 3 REASON AND EMOTIONS IN HUMAN CONDUCT

Structure

- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Objectives
- 3.3 Dichotomy between Reason and Emotion
- 3.4 Implications of the Dichotomy
- 3.5 Emotions in Moral Education
- 3.6 Factors of Control
- 3.7 Judgement and Action in Moral Education.
- 3.8 Moral Weakness
- 3.9 Let Us Sum Up
- 3.10 Answers to Check Your Progress
- 3.11 References

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous unit, was about various theories of conduct, which aimed at defining and clarifying the criteria of morally good behaviour. You also learnt that conduct, which can be justified on the basis of valid reasons, is morally worthwhile and good behaviour. That is rationality constitutes a core element in ethical behaviour. Behaviour that is characterized as irrational, incoherent, or inconsistent cannot be called ethically desirable, worthwhile or good behaviour. Mere rationality of behaviour cannot be called sufficient criterion to define morality. There are certain human emotions like empathy, sympathy, caring for others, loving them, etc. devoid of which no behaviour can be morally good, even if it is supported by valid reasons. It will be quite apt to say that reason is an essential condition of morality, but it is certainly not a sufficient condition. There are certain human emotions like greed, selfishness, etc. which are a direct anti-thesis of morally good behaviour because they undermine the strength of reason and lead one to follow one's selfish interests. That is why we are told to control such emotions in order to act morally.

In this unit, we shall try to discuss the dichotomy between reason and emotion, as also the positive contribution of emotions in morality.

3.2 OBJECTIVES

Following a study of this unit you should be able to:

- bring out the dichotomy between reason and emotion;
- discuss the implication of this dichotomy for education;
- highlight the positive role of emotions in moral education;
- explain, how both judgement and action are essential to moral education; and

- state the reasons of moral weakness, and suggest ways to overcome the same

3.3 DICHOTOMY BETWEEN REASON AND EMOTION

There existed always a tension between intellectual and emotional aspects in human being's life, especially in the moral context. For the most part reason and emotion have been in conflict with each other, as incompatible to the development of moral character. But this is also a fact that both reason and emotion constitute essential dimensions or domains of morality. They are like two faces of a coin-inseparable from each other. In a moral conflict each of these may behave as an anti-thesis of the other.

In the preceding unit of this block, you have read that no moral judgement can be said to be worthwhile unless it is rational-consistent and coherent. But without the element of "caring for others", no action can be called moral.

The supporters of rationality for moral behaviour, especially Plato (Greek philosopher, mathematician, writer of the period 428-327 BC), Kant (Immanuel Kant—an 18th century German philosopher), Piaget (1927 –1987), a Swiss developmental psychologist), Kohlberg) a Jewish American psychologist (1896 –1980) known for his work in the area of moral education and reasoning) and his associates consider reason as central to moral philosophy. Development of reason therefore becomes the main concern of education. Accordingly education should overcome as effectively as possible the tendencies of animal life dominated by passions or emotions within us. The state of being a moral agent is the one in which the individual has come to know what is right. Socrates had also maintained that virtue is the *knowledge* of the "good". According to Plato virtue or morality is the culmination of the knowledge of right. Once one obtains this knowledge (of the right), one cannot avoid being virtuous.

Reason, according to rationalists, is the supreme factor in morality; passions and emotions are unfortunate appendix (additional features) of human life, which need to be controlled, tamed or subdued. Aristotle went to the extent of saying reason and intellectual contemplation to be truly human. Man's true happiness lies in and engaging oneself in thinking activities of the highest order. But a question may be asked whether it would be right to break off such contemplation to save the life of a drowning man. Plato, however, recognized the conflict that arises between what we know to be right and what we recognize as pleasurable.

The Christian theology also holds passions, emotions or appetites as domain of Satan, which led Adam to fall from Grace. The passions, therefore, need to be suppressed and tamed. In this line of thought, Kant also believed that feelings and emotions are hindrances on the way of rational morality. According to him, man is unfortunately obstructed with feelings and emotions, which check him from becoming a fully rational "being". In order that man can behave the way shown to be right by application of reason, feelings and emotions need to be overcome. According to Kant, discovering right course of action is a rational activity. The natural inclinations (feelings, emotions, etc.) merely serve to deflect one from acting on the right path shown by reason.

In fact morality may be committed with destruction of natural passions as well as with their preservation. Both reason and emotions are important for human beings. The gap between reason and emotion need to be bridged by, what Hegel, a German philosopher called, the “morality of love”. Many people hold that moral knowledge cannot be attained by reason alone. For example, before making any moral judgement we need to be fully conversant with the non-moral facts of the case. It is on an understanding of the total situation (situational reality) alone, that right judgement (and hence right action) can be taken. If our moral judgement does not consider the situational reality, the action taken on that is likely to be wrong. We can find answer to moral questions only when we know how people behave and what they do in moral situations. The empiricists recognized the importance of emotions in moral behaviour. According to them moral belief and behaviour are explicable only in terms of emotions people have or the way they feel. Accordingly, moral behaviour is to be assessed in terms of social utility of what people feel to be right, of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain.

Thus, there is a dichotomy between man’s intellect and his emotions and a tangible solution to the problem is not there.

3.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DICHOTOMY

The situation arising out of the conviction of divorce of intellect from emotions may have serious implication, in education. In fact, stressing the one and ignoring the other aspect of moral behaviour in the curriculum of the child will deprive him of becoming a truly morally and educated person. As you might know, human personality, according to Benjamin Bloom (1913-1999) an American educational psychologist consists of three dimensions – the cognitive, the affective and the psychomotor domains. Any educational programme, which does not take full account of any of the three domains, will remain incomplete and therefore, will not achieve the goals of education. We must not forget that development of appropriate feelings (affective domain) is an integral part of education including moral education. It is not possible, even in theory, that one is educated even though he/she has not developed worthwhile attitudes, feelings and emotions; and he/she does not appreciate what is worth appreciating. It will be absurd to say that some one is educated but s/he loves nothing, is interested in nothing, and is enthused by nothing. To be educated is to have been brought up to care for certain things. To take a purely rationalist approach amounts denying that our pupils have feelings or individuality; it is to turn them into computers or robots.

The worst effect of the divorce of intellect from emotion can be seen when one recommends devices of suppression of emotions with the sole purpose of attaining universality, objectivity and morality in moral behaviour. Recently a practice is seen in many schools where steps are taken for taming of emotions or passions. Some of the agencies in schools or in the society strongly recommend repression of feelings without being aware that such repression can ultimately lead to varieties of psychoneurosis or obsessive – compulsive behaviours and extreme form of anxiety. Such repression of feelings and passions may develop psychosomatic disorders (like hysteria) engender feelings of guilt and shame. We must not forget that character disorders like alcoholism, sexual repression, psychopathic tendencies, etc. may develop because of repressed feelings and desires.

Another very dangerous effect of the application of repressive devices on the part of parents, society or teachers in early childhood is the development of extremely strong super-ego. This occurs as a result of taboos of the culture. We should remember that development of conscience or what Freud, called ego-ideal, is not the small voice of God, but rather it is developed, by internalising fear and other unpleasant experiences in the childhood. The development of ego ideal takes place through an unconscious process and, therefore, always has negative connotation. The emotions and feelings repressed in this process continue to affect our attitudes and behaviour in unconscious and unrecognised manner. That is why, in our later life, we quite often are not able to explain our behaviour to others, and even to ourselves. A refusal to partake any kind of alcoholic drink under any circumstances, even where its medicinal value is obvious, for example, cannot be explained by the individual because such internalisation or repression has taken place unconsciously. So the ego-ideal developed as a result of repression has to be deplored. But still we need to develop some kind of conscience or self-image, which helps us in taking some decision or judgement. We have to be careful that we don't develop a distorted conscience, through repression, subjugation or taming of emotion. We should develop the same through conscious and deliberate choices. The above example of totally unreasonable rejection of alcohol in all its forms is one instance of this kind of distortion. The development of such taboos some times is so strong that one is willing to die or see a child or some relative die than to break the taboo.

A strong devices used for repression of desires, feelings and emotions in early childhood, may not lead in certain cases to development of ego-ideal or a strong conscience but lead to reaction formation. Some children who are deprived of the love of parents or lack close attachment with their parents are strongly repressed by the use of punishment mechanisms or through unconvincing and harsh reasoning by parents may develop in them aggression and hostility. In many cases, they become psychopaths or sociopaths. Such an individual displays complete indifference to others in his behaviour. He is often described as "affectionless" character – one who has no sense of guilt. He is the very anti-thesis of a morally developed individual.

3.5 EMOTIONS IN MORAL EDUCATION

In the earlier units of this block as well as in the earlier section of this unit, we saw that reason or rationality plays an important role in determining the nature of morality and hence moral education. Any behaviour, which is not rational or cannot be supported by valid reason, cannot be termed as moral. If, for example, we follow one principle of action today and another tomorrow, our behaviour is inconsistent; hence cannot be termed moral. We have also seen that behaving morally is not a rational process alone, because rationality determines only the form of morality and not its content. To behave morally, we must take care of others' interests, feel for them, respect individual freedom of others as we do for us, help the needy to the extent it is possible for us, etc. Such is the "content" of morality. In essence reason and emotion in the context of moral education are the two pillars on which the whole edifice of morality rests : the former acts as a *guide* and the latter as a *goad* : Obviously, the two are linked together in moral judgement and moral action. We may say that reason without emotion is lame, and emotion without reason is blind.

Some people argue that reason and feeling are usually in conflict with each other; tagging us in different directions. But if we reflect upon different moral situations, we find that our inclinations do not always push us towards behaviour that is at variance with rationality. Often our reason and inclination are in agreement or in harmony, instead of being in conflict. No doubt, there are some occasions when we are faced by two distinct courses of actions, one dictated by reason and the other guided by emotion. In moral choice we find a confusing jumble of reason, conscience, desire, pleasure, concern for the feelings of others. Just as it is impossible in any practical educational context to separate the cognitive from the affective goals, in the same way, it is difficult to distinguish these two aspects in any practical moral issue.

In a moral context, the relation of feeling with reason is of reciprocity rather than of conflict. Therefore emotions need to be educated rather than tamed or suppressed. Our emotions depend on our cognition and vice-versa. Sometimes, emotions are the result of the ways in which we perceive situations. They result from what the reason tells us about the world. The converse is also true. Our emotions sometimes, affect the way we perceive the situation. That is why a group of thinkers, called phenomenologists, assert that every man's perceptions are unique because they are intimately related with emotions and personality. Any situation of moral choice, therefore, demands a proper cognition in order so that we may arrive at a correct moral choice or judgement. In short, we can say that we need to make realistic appraisal of situations and understand them in order to be able to act appropriately. We have already discussed in this unit about the dangers involved in the control of emotions. But it does not mean that we should let them free. What is dangerous is the repression of emotions, not their control. Undoubtedly, the children need to appropriately control their emotions. They need discipline. Teachers can help them to develop certain habits of good behaviour when they are young. Thus in the moral education of young children some kind of training or indoctrination or what Skinner calls shaping of behaviour, is unavoidable.

3.6 FACTORS OF CONTROL

There are different kinds of controls and disciplines. The only kind of discipline that can be accepted as a part of educational process is self-discipline. Whatever devices we use, the goal must be to produce a person who is in control of his emotion, emotion which prevents one from executing his own moral decisions. The control should be one of self-control, which is conscious and self-initiated.

In addition to controlling the emotions deliberately and consciously, we must help children to understand their feelings so that they accept or express them through socially desirable ways; such as dance or drama. The role-play is a technique, which helps in development of the ability to see things from someone else's point of view. This kind of insight into the feelings of others is an important aim of education.

There is another point to make about education of emotions that is relevant to moral education. There are some emotions which need to be nurtured like sympathy, empathy, love and care for others, etc. Instead of controlling such emotions, we must rather welcome, embrace and promote them. Some impulses or inclinations are not generally regarded as bad; they are not seen as impulses or inclination to be controlled or repressed but are felt to be the motivating force of our behaviour.

To be fully moral an action should not only conform to certain standards of rationality, but it should also be performed with certain degree of motivation. Perhaps it not morally so good to feed and clothe a filthy tramp in a cold and indifferent way, than to embrace or love him. It is not enough for an action to be performed “*unwillingly*”, but it must be done willingly.

There are people who claim that moral education should concern itself with the promotion of certain kinds of feelings in pupils. We should recognize the feelings of others understand and treat them as similar to us. Not only that, we should sympathize with them, feel for them, empathize with them and even love them. For true moral education, it is not sufficient to know what is right at cognitive level only, it is also a matter of promoting those that will support and enhance our moral action. In actual practice in schools, such feelings and emotions can be better developed through community living and social service. Through such activities we can learn which emotions need to be educated and how we can do that.

So moral education does not merely include the understanding of what is right and what ought to be done, it also involves feelings and emotions which goad our behaviour to do what we ought to do.

Check Your Progress 1

(i) What are the factors of emotions?

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.....

(ii) What is moral weakness?

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3.7 JUDGEMENT AND ACTION IN MORAL EDUCATION

The relationships between judgement and action, especially in the moral contexts have interesting implications for the areas of moral education and moral development. The issue of moral judgement and moral action in fact, lies at the heart of moral development. The concept of morality entails all the three dimensions of personality – the cognitive (judgemental), the affective (feelings, emotion and intentions) and psychomotor (action). Mere outward behaviour cannot be taken as moral or not moral. One would certainly agree that, although having certain reasons of some kind is a necessary part of being a moral agent, this cannot be a sufficient condition to be a moral agent. To be designated as moral agent, one must act in accordance with these reasons and intentions. Morality is, by nature, a practical business, as it is basically concerned with what ought to be done or what is right to do. Morality cannot be accounted for just in terms of either performing particular kinds of actions or in terms of making particular kinds of judgements. It must involve both of these, i.e. how a person thinks, feels and behaves.

Many approaches to moral education and moral development, however, ignore this complex balance between judgement and action. For example, Piaget, Kohlberg and his associates tried to study moral development mainly in terms of children's moral judgement. Though, they did not completely ignore moral action, their main thrust was directed towards moral judgements. On the other hand, the traditional notion of moral training aimed at inculcating in children a particular code of moral conduct (telling the truth, respecting one's elders, keeping one's promises etc.). But such notions need to be replaced by furthering children's understanding of moral issues. In contrast to judgemental approaches, the opposing traditions seem to over-emphasize behaviour at the expense of judgement and understanding. For example, behaviour modification techniques of Skinner had no place for concepts like intention or judgement, belief, choice, responsibility and justice. A child behaves morally not because he understands that his behaviour is right but because his behaviour is so shaped through appropriate arrangement of rewards and punishments. We can see that this behavioural approach to morality is not moral education but moral training. According to it, it is the standard of behaviour in and out of school, which is a measure of success or failure of moral teaching.

3.8 MORAL WEAKNESS

In dealing with moral education, we encounter a specific practical problem – the problem of moral weakness. For example, a child may have learnt certain skills, which satisfy certain judgemental criteria, but may fail to act in accordance with what he has judged to be right. This educational problem of moral weakness is concerned with how to encourage children to act upon their moral judgement. Let us try to analyse the solution of such a problem.

When we fail to act upon what we think to be right or good, we are guilty of moral weakness. It usually happens when we are overcome by overpowering emotions, desires or other irrational factors. We are not able to withstand such pressures either because our 'will' or our 'conscience' is too weak. Moral education in such cases will imply strengthening the will or conscience to educate emotions and thus build a strong character. Some thinkers reject concepts like weak will or conscience. According to them, moral weakness is not a battle between our will and our emotions, but rather a conflict or incompatibility between two kinds of *reasons for actions*. Reasons can justify as well as motivate a person for action. I may for instance believe that I ought to visit my friend in hospital (who is ill), because hospital patients generally feel happy when visited by friends and hence recover more quickly. I also would want to be visited if I were in his place. There are justifiable reasons for visiting hospital patients, and I also agree with those reasons. Still, I may not be able to visit my friend, perhaps, I don't have time or energy or perhaps the hospital environment is not conducive to me, etc. In such situations, there are no reasons, which motivate me to visit my friend. So reasons, which justify and reasons that motivate are logically separate. This distinction offers a general explanation for moral weakness. It is not always necessary that inclinations and obligations are separate; they may coincide also.

Check Your Progress 2

(i) Name the supporters of rationality of moral behaviour?

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.....

(ii) What does repression of emotions result in?

.....
.....

(iii) What is the relationship between Reason and Emotion?

.....
.....

However, it is the conflict between two kinds of reasons (justificatory and motivational) which in actual practice provide instances of moral weakness.

3.9 LET US SUM UP

The present unit is an attempt to highlight the dichotomy existing between reasons and emotions in a moral context. While examining the differential roles of the two, it is argued that from one perspective, reasons and emotions constitute essential conditions to morality. But from another angle, they are anti-thesis to one another. According to rationalists like Plato, Kant, Piaget and Kohlberg reason is fully human and hence its development is the main concern of education. The task of education is also to overcome the animal life of passions or emotions. The Christian ethics, the Gita, and other Indian scriptures also consider passions or emotions as hindrances in the path of good human behaviour and, therefore recommend their control. However, this is not true. True moral education involves development of certain emotions like love, care, empathy, etc. So if we believe in a complete divorce of intellect from emotions, it may have serious implication for education. With the conviction of this divorce if we repress the emotions of children, they may develop psychosomatic disorders and thereby shall be digressed from achieving their goal of education. Many such adverse effects have been discussed in the unit, in view of the dichotomy between reasons and emotions. In fact in a moral context, the relation of feeling with reason is of reciprocity rather than of conflict. What exactly we need as teachers is, instead of suppressing or repressing the emotions we should educate the emotions of children, so that they may understand their appropriate use at the appropriate time.

The other aspect discussed in the unit is judgement vis-à-vis action in a moral context. This domain has interesting implications for moral education and moral development of children. Proper moral development consists in judging an act or situation and acting in an appropriate manner. Obviously in a moral act all the three: reason, emotion and psychomotor are involved. We also clearly defined the problem of moral weakness. For example, a child may, in a specific real situation, judge what

he ought to do. But still, for certain reasons he is not inclined to do what he ought to do. According to some thinkers this happens when we are overpowered by irrational factors or desires which become hindrances in the path of our duty. According to other group of thinkers moral weakness is the result of the conflict between justificatory reasons and motivational reasons.

3.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- (i) The supporters of rationality in moral behaviour are Plato, Kant, Kohlberg and Piaget who consider reason to be central to moral philosophy.
- (ii) Repression can lead to varieties of psychoneurosis or obsessive compulsive behaviours and extreme anxiety. Such repression may lead to psychosomatic disorders like hysteria and other character disorders of alcoholism, sexual repression etc.
- (iii) These are like two pillars of moral education on which the whole edifice of morality rests. The former (reason) acts as a guide and the latter (emotion) as goad. The two are linked together in moral judgement and moral action.

Check Your Progress 2

- (i) The factors of control of emotions are as follows:
 - a) Self-control which is self initiated
 - b) Help the children to understand their feelings by role-plays
 - c) Nurturing emotions like sympathy, empathy, love, care etc.
- (ii) When we fail to act upon what we think to be right or good we are guilty of moral weakness. It happens when we are overcome by overpowering emotions, desires other irrational factors.

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UNIT 4 CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY

Structure

- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Objectives
- 4.3 Personality Versus Character
 - 4.3.1 Components of Personality
- 4.4 Early Attempts at Classification of Personality
- 4.5 The Trait Cluster or Dominant Component Concept of Personality
- 4.6 Personality Disorders
- 4.7 Character and its Factors/ Vectors
- 4.8 Character-Personality: Patterns
 - 4.8.1 The Amoral Individual
 - 4.8.2 The Expedient Individual
 - 4.8.3 The Conformer
 - 4.8.4 The Irrational-Conscientious Personality
 - 4.8.5 The Rational-Altruistic
- 4.9 Let Us Sum Up
- 4.10 Answers to Check Your Progress.
- 4.11 References

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Most of us use the terms character and personality in common parlance when we want to communicate about people's behaviour, their strengths and weaknesses. But we use these terms with sufficient degree of vagueness, without probably understanding the real connotations of these in the wider context. For example, if you come in contact with a person who has a well built body, reasonably good height and a forceful voice, which can influence you and other people, you may tend to say that he/she has a good personality. Similarly, the term character is very often associated with sexual behaviour or at the most with honesty in dealing with others. But these are only outward manifestations of these terms. The two terms, in fact, have much in common and it is difficult to clearly distinguish the two. Character refers to socially relevant behaviour trends that have particular moral and ethical implications. When we are concerned with behaviors commonly labelled as good or bad, desirable or undesirable and when activities are considered with reference to their ethical or moral implications, we speak of character rather than of personality. Traits for lying, cheating, stealing not keeping one's promises are dominantly (negative) character traits. (On the other hand traits like introversion-extraversion, neuroticism, intelligence, perseverance, self-esteem, friendliness, hostility, judgement, etc. are personality traits. What are the requirements of character and personality? Character cannot include personality, but personality must include the capacities of character and not be limited by them. Character requires understanding, strength of will, perseverance, and energy. What personality requires is pure

understanding, independent of a second person. The general endowments of personality are: pure intelligence in the mind, warmth and expansiveness in the heart, dynamism in the vital, endurance and perseverance in the physical. A man with personality won't be bound by his opinions or have rigid preferences. He will prefer what is best at that moment and be willing to change his habits if necessary.

In this unit, we shall attempt to delineate these concepts more deeply and see how they are related to moral and ethical development of children.

4.2 OBJECTIVES

Following a study of this unit you should be able to:

- discuss the early attempts at classification of personality in terms of physique and character;
- discuss the trait-cluster theories of personality;
- examine the different factors or vectors that determine character;
- classify different character personality patterns based on the dominant factors of character;
- explain the different character-personality patterns with appropriate examples;
- bring out the moral and ethical implications of different character-personality patterns

4.3 PERSONALITY VERSUS CHARACTER

We often use the words personality and character interchangeably to describe ourselves and others. However, these words are not synonymous; rather they indicate two distinct, yet related attributes of being. Webster defines personality as '*the quality or state of being a person,*' and character as '*the complex of mental and ethical traits marking and often individualizing a person.*' According to Webster, personality is merely the state of existing!

Though we often use the word to indicate specific behavioral traits and preferences of a person, personality itself is inherent to being alive and conscious. What follows is that character is the manifestation of these traits. In other words, we have personality by virtue of being, but we understand ourselves and others as individual conscious persons through character. That means that character can influence personality, but personality is unchanging.

4.3.1 Components of Personality

While there are many different theories of personality, the first step is to understand exactly what is meant by the term personality. A brief definition would be that personality is made up of the characteristic patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviors that make a person unique. In addition to this, personality arises from within the individual and remains fairly consistent throughout life.

Some of the fundamental characteristics of personality include:

- Consistency - There is generally a recognizable order and regularity to behaviors. Essentially, people act in the same ways or similar ways in a variety of situations.
- Psychological and physiological - Personality is a psychological construct, but research suggests that it is also influenced by biological processes and needs.
- Impact behaviours and actions - Personality does not just influence how we move and respond in our environment; it also *causes* us to act in certain ways.
- Multiple expressions - Personality is displayed in more than just behaviour. It can also be seen in our thoughts, feelings, close relationships and other social interactions.

4.4 EARLY ATTEMPTS AT CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONALITY

In the West, as also in India attempts were made to classify personality of individuals on the basis of their physique and some times on the basis of chemique (biochemical and glandular characteristics). William Herbert Sheldon (1898–1977), an American psychologist, related body with temperament. The personality types proposed by Sheldon on the basis of bodily constitution were: (i) *endomorph*ic – with relatively prominent abdomen and fatty tissues; (ii) *mesomorph*ic – muscular built and strong bones (athletic type); and (iii) *ectomorph*ic – relatively delicate and thin body built. A typically endomorphic person, for example, is likely to be an obese, mesomorphic, square and muscular and the ectomorphic, tall and thin. Describing people on the basis of their body features and associating them with their temperament is called *Somato-types*.

Sheldon and Stevens found endomorphic to be correlated with highly comfort loving, less reactive and relaxed (viscerotonic), mesomorphic, as one, who loves physical adventure, competitive aggressiveness, and general assertiveness (somatotonic), ectomorphic as one correlated with those who express fast reactions, chronic fatigue, suppressed social responsiveness, restraint and tense posture (cerebrotonic).

In ancient Greece, personality was described in terms of chemique or biochemical and glandular characteristics. The term chemique was used by Woodworth and Marquis in 1947. These individuals are said to have varying degrees of the following four temperaments: the sanguine (extrovert), the choleric (energetic), the phlegmatic, and the melancholic (thoughtful, worried).

A typically sanguine person is one, who has an excess of blood, the choleric, excess of bile; the phlegmatic excess of mucus, and the melancholic, excess of spleen. Interestingly, one can easily draw a parallel between the ancient Greek and ancient Indian classifications (Ayurveda) which described the above mentioned four temperaments respectively as *rakta pradhan*, *pitta pradhan*, *kaffa pradhan* and *vayu pradhan*.

But today such classifications of personality in terms of distinctive types have remained only of historical importance. Pigeon holing, people into “types” is an attempt to

over simplify the complexity of human personality. Thinking of a ‘pure type’ can only be an exception, never a rule. People in fact, may have characteristics of various groups in varying degrees. On each of these traits, a person can be said to have a position some where on a continuum from extremely high to extremely low.

4.5 THE TRAIT CLUSTER OR DOMINANT COMPONENT CONCEPT OF PERSONALITY

The recent attempts at character and personality descriptions are quantitative. In this process, measurements on a large number of behaviour traits are taken of a large number of individuals. Then inter-correlations among these variables are computed. From the correlations, cluster of traits and set of symptoms are identified. These trait-syndromes are represented by a set of trait clusters that inter-correlate highly with one another, very low or not at all with measures of other trait clusters. These statistically isolated components are considered to represent personality “factors” or character factors. In this way personality and character can be described in terms of relative strengths of various components or factors.

Eysenck (1960) attempted to classify personality in terms of Extroversion-Introversion, Neuroticism, and psychoticism dimensions. A typically extrovert will be one who is highly sociable, happy-go-lucky, makes friends easily, is talkative, etc. The introvert will be extremely low on all such traits. A person, high on neuroticism dimension will be emotionally unstable whereas a person low on the dimension will be emotionally stable. Person with high score on psychoticism will be a tough-minded person and low on this dimension will be tender minded. In this way a number of psychologists worked on personality and have evolved different theories. Detailed description of such theories is beyond the scope of this unit. We shall be mainly concerned with those personality types which involve ethical or moral dimensions.

4.6 PERSONALITY DISORDERS

Personality Disorders are mental illnesses that share several unique qualities. They contain symptoms that are enduring and play a major role in most, if not all, aspects of the person’s life. While many disorders vacillate in terms of symptom presence and intensity, personality disorders typically remain relatively constant.

To be diagnosed with a disorder in this category, a psychologist will look for the following criteria:

1. Symptoms have been present for an extended period of time, are inflexible and pervasive, and are not a result of alcohol or drugs or another psychiatric disorder. The history of symptoms can be traced back to adolescence or at least early adulthood.
2. The symptoms have caused and continue to cause significant distress or negative consequences in different aspects of the person’s life.
3. Symptoms are seen in at least two of the following areas:
 - o Thoughts (ways of looking at the world, thinking about self or others, and interacting)

- o Emotions (appropriateness, intensity, and range of emotional functioning)
- o Interpersonal Functioning (relationships and interpersonal skills)

a) Antisocial Personality Disorder

This disorder was previously known as both psychopathic and Sociopathic personality disorder. Like most personality disorders, there are many factors that may contribute to the development of symptoms. Because the symptoms are long lasting, the idea that symptoms begin to emerge in childhood or at least adolescence is well accepted. The negative consequences of such symptoms, however, may not show themselves until adulthood.

These behaviors include difficulty with authority, legal altercations, cruelty to animals, fire setting, and a dislike or anger toward authority. This disorder is diagnosed much more frequently in male.

The symptoms of antisocial personality disorder include a longstanding pattern (after the age of 15) of disregard for the rights of others. There is a failure to conform to society's norms and expectations that often results in numerous arrests or legal involvement as well as a history of deceitfulness. Some argue that a major component of this disorder is the reduced ability to feel empathy for other people. This inability to see the hurts, concerns, and other feelings of people often results in a disregard for these aspects of human interaction. Finally, irresponsible behavior often accompanies this disorder as well as a lack of remorse for wrongdoings.

Treatment for this disorder is very rarely sought. There is a limited amount of insight into the symptoms, and the negative consequences are often blamed on society. In this sense, treatment options are limited. Some research has found long term insight oriented therapy to be effective, but getting the individual to commit to this treatment is a major obstacle.

People with antisocial personality disorder typically see the world as having the problems, not him or herself, and therefore rarely seek treatment. If progress is made, it is typically over an extended period of time.

b) Borderline Personality Disorder

The major symptoms of this disorder revolve around unstable relationships, poor or negative sense of self, inconsistent moods, and significant impulsivity. There is an intense fear of abandonment with this disorder that interferes with many aspects of the individual's life. This fear often acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy as they cling to others, are very needy, feel helpless, and become overly involved and immediately attached. When the fear of abandonment becomes overwhelming, they will often push others out of their life as if trying to avoid getting rejected. The cycle most often continues as the individual will then try everything to get people back in his or her life and once again becomes clingy, needy, and helpless.

The fact that people often do leave someone who exhibits this behavior only proves to support their distorted belief that they are insignificant, worthless, and unloved. At this point in the cycle, the individual may exhibit self-harming behaviors such as suicide attempts, mock suicidal attempts (where the goal is to get rescued and lure others back into the individual's life), cutting or other self-mutilating behavior. There

is often intense and sudden anger involved, directed both at self and others, as well as a difficulty controlling destructive behaviors.

Treatment for this disorder is long term in nature since the symptoms have been present for an extended time and interfere with many aspects of the person's life. Insight oriented therapy can be helpful but research is showing an increased support for a cognitive-behavioral approach. In other words, the individual's thoughts and actions are monitored both by the self and therapist and specific behaviors are counted and a plan is made to gradually reduce those thoughts and behaviors that are seen as negative. A combined approach may be best, but either way requires intensive time and effort.

While the disorder is chronic in nature, gradual improvements with work are definitely seen. While it is difficult for anyone to change major aspects of their personality, the symptoms of this disorder can be reduced in both number and intensity. Long term treatment is almost always required.

c) Narcissistic Personality Disorder

The symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder revolve around a pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and sense of entitlement. Often individuals feel overly important and will exaggerate achievements and will accept, and often demand, praise and admiration despite worthy achievements. They may be overwhelmed with fantasies involving unlimited success, power, love, or beauty and feel that they can only be understood by others who are, like them, superior in some aspect of life.

There is a sense of entitlement, of being more deserving than others based solely on their superiority. These symptoms, however, are a result of an underlying sense of inferiority and are often seen as overcompensation. Because of this, they are often envious and even angry of others who have more, receive more respect or attention, or otherwise steal away the spotlight.

Treatment for this disorder is very rarely sought. There is a limited amount of insight into the symptoms, and the negative consequences are often blamed on society. In this sense, treatment options are limited. Some research has found long term insight oriented therapy to be effective, but getting the individual to commit to this treatment is a major obstacle.

4.7 CHARACTER AND ITS FACTORS/VECTORS

Peck et. al. (1962) found six major components, factors or vectors which contribute to the overall maturity of one's character.

These components are:

- Moral stability (the tendency to follow moral code willingly and with satisfaction).
- Ego-strength (perceptual accuracy, rational judgement and appropriate action)
- Super-ego strength (the degree of inner control over behaviour or conscience)
- Spontaneity (direct expression of feelings and wishes)
- Friendliness (generalized warmth of feeling for others).

- Hostility-guilt complex (strong feelings of hostility and guilt)

It is pertinent to mention that moral stability ego-strength; super-ego strength and friendliness are positively correlated with general maturity of character. Spontaneity shows a curious relationship with maturity of character. People at both the extreme ends of maturity scales are high in spontaneity, whereas those of intermediate maturity of character are low in spontaneity. This means that highly spontaneous individuals may be either highly mature or highly immature in their character development. The hostility-guilt-complex is negatively correlated with character development.

Check Your Progress 1

(i) Name the four types of personality patterns based on biochemical and glandular characteristics.

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(ii) Name the six factors that contribute to formation of character according to Peck et al.

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4.8 CHARACTER-PERSONALITY PATTERNS

On the basis of the relative strength of these six factors, five character-personality patterns have been found. These character organisations are discussed briefly as under:

- The Amoral type: moral stability, super-ego strength, and friendliness; high in hostility and guilt.
- The expedient type: Below average in ego-strength, super-ego strength, moral stability and friendliness; high in spontaneity and hostility guilt.
- Conforming type: Moderate ego, super-ego and friendliness.
- The irrational-conscientious type: Weak to moderate in ego strength, low in friendliness, high in hostility-guilt, super-ego strength and moral stability.
- The rationalistic-altruistic type: high in ego-strength, super-ego strength, moral-stability spontaneity and friendliness, but low in hostility guilt.

A brief description of individuals typically representing the above types is given below:

4.8.1 The Amoral Individual

The infant begins as an amoral individual – the one who can neither be called moral nor immoral. Such a person has inaccurate perception, highly unstable emotions and absence of self-control. He/she is impulsive and spontaneous; his/her behaviour is determined on the basis of physical rewards and punishments. The adult amoral

type becomes arrested at the infantile stage of development. In some extreme cases adult psychopath personality is of this type.

Example: A twenty year old boy was referred to a psychologist by district court. His social history revealed a pattern of defiance to authority, violent temper resulting in impulsive and irresponsible behaviour, lack of concern for the consequences of his acts. He was a chronic liar, and had reports of chronic truancy and running away from home. He very often forged his father's signature on cheques and ultimately got arrested. An interview with him showed that he could easily fabricate stories. He had superior general intelligence and could rationalize his behaviour in an effective manner.

4.8.2 The Expedient Individual

Expedient individuals are those who have learned about social rewards and punishment patterns of their cultures and are controlled by immediate consequences. They are primarily self-centred, their honesty or dishonesty depends on situations and apparent advantage of these. In an experiment, children below the age of nine told that they feel sorry for lies that do not work, but not for undetected lies. The adult expedient may act honestly because it is good business to have truth telling reputation and to have people's confidence in him. However, when probable rewards become sufficiently large, or if he thinks he can avoid being detected he would be dishonest. That is if the situation is such that telling a lie would work, they will not hesitate; but if they think they would be detected or caught, they will pretend to be honest. Such a person conforms to social expectations, in order to achieve personal advantage. He has no internalised set of ideals, has no conscience or super-ego.

4.8.3 The Conformer

Children in the middle and late childhood stage of their development often display conforming patterns of social behaviour. At this stage the child internalises one general principle of behaviour i.e. to do what one should; and what one shouldn't, is to conform to rules of his social group. He tends to follow the social norms and thereby avoids the shame of social disapproval. In this respect, the individual (conformer) is different from the expedient individual. The expedient plays each situation to pick relevant social norms and follows them to show others that he has respect for such norms. However in reality, he tries to gain sympathy and confidence of the social group. The conformer, on the other hand, follows these rules from the core of his heart, conventionally and rigidly. He is controlled by external (social) sanctions and feels ashamed when deviates from social mores. 'Right' for him means acting according to social rules and conventions. He is uncomfortable when such rules, customs, or principles are violated by him. He would never like to violate the rules even if breaking them is in general human or social welfare. He tends to adhere to them under all circumstances. For example, he would never like to tell a lie in any circumstance even if it for a good cause.

Following is a typical example of a conformist child.

Veena belonged to a lower middle class family. Her father was a strict disciplinarian who would tolerate no nonsense or misdeed from his children. Veena's mother was very efficient but a passive person. Both parents were religious and regularly

attended prayer ceremonies. Veena's home environment was rigid, restrictive, one that fostered conformity and dependency. Spontaneity self-expression and rationality were not encouraged or rewarded.

Veena, at the age of 10, was rated as a superior individual by her parents, teachers and peers. She was very responsible, always finished her tasks on time, did her share of work and was polite, honest and controlled. Being good for her meant respecting parents and teachers, remaining neat and clean and being nice to younger brothers and sisters. Being bad, for her was disobeying parents or elders, talking back to teachers and being untidy. By the time, Veena was fifteen her popularity had declined considerably. She associated with only those boys/girls who were just like her. She was over anxious to please lest she should make mistakes. The pattern of behaviour that was considered desirable at the age of ten had remained unchanged, whereas the frame of reference by which she was judged at the age of 15 changed. Elders started calling her immature, one whose development had been arrested. Veena's behaviour was rigid rather than spontaneous, she had a good deal of social anxiety. Though she pretended to look like her classmates, but in reality she was unable to display depth of feeling towards them.

4.8.4 The Irrational-Conscientious Personality

The irrational-conscientious person is one who has internalised a behaviour code that he strongly believes. The total behaviour of the individual is guided by this code of conduct. If such a person sees an act as honest, he carries it out, irrespective of whether or not other persons approve of it and irrespective of its consequences on others. When his acts conflict with his code, he feels guilty, he violates his own integrity.

Of course, the internalisation of a set of ideals is a stage in normal development. It is a characteristic of maturity. The irrational component of this syndrome, constitutes a blind alley. Such an individual develops a rigid, logic-tight system that functions autonomously and without regard to its social consequences. Acts good or bad in a kind of absolute manner because of their self-evident nature or because one's conscience tells him so. Such people do not recognize that rules and principles which they have internalised are originally man made, and are intended to serve humane or altruistic purposes.

4.8.5 The Rational-Altruistic

In most cultures, the rational-altruistic individual is considered at the highest level of character development. Persons possessing this level of character development have a set of appropriate internalised moral principles, but these internalised values constitute an open rather than a closed system. These principles are subject to modifications in view of circumstances. The individual behaviour is determined not only by his own conscience but also by the judgemental effects on others. Such a person is honest and loyal because such behaviour contributes to the welfare of other persons including his own.

Such type of individual is rational because he evaluates his conduct realistically and in terms of probable consequences. He does not act impulsively or compulsively in rigid ways. He is altruistic, because he considers the ultimate welfare of others as well as of himself. He does not blindly follow the internalised rules and principles

without regard to its social effects on others. Such an individual is flexible and his behaviour is guided by “spirit” rather than “letter” of the law. He is consistent and firm in his principles for which he stands but is not rigid in his behaviour.

Check Your Progress 2

(i) What are the five character patterns based on Peck’s factors?

.....

(ii) What is dominant Component Concept?

.....

(iii) Define Rational altruistic individual?

.....

4.9 LET US SUM UP

The unit aims at clarifying the meaning of the terms character and personality especially in the context of ethical human behaviour. It starts with an attempt to classify personality on the basis of somatotype-body built, on the basis of chemique and in terms of Ayurvedic components– *rakta, pitta, kaffa and vayu*, the predominance of each which gives rise to a distinct temperament. The unit also discusses trait-cluster dominant concept of personality as given by modern psychologists. In all such attempts to classify personality, care has been taken to relate the same with corresponding temperament and character.

Peck et. al. (1962) found six components or vectors which contributed to overall maturity of one’s character. They are moral stability, ego strength, super-ego strength, friendliness and hostility-guilt complex. On the basis of relative strengths of these six vectors, five character-personality patterns are formed which have specific ethical considerations. The unit briefly highlights the specific characteristics of these patterns in a moral or ethical context. The five character-personality patterns briefly discussed in this unit are: (a) Amoral type, (b) expedient type, (c) conforming type, (d) the irrational-conscientious type, and (e) the rational-altruistic type.

4.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- (i) The three types of personality patterns based on biochemical and glandular characteristics are i) endomorphic b) mesomorphic c) ectomorphic.
- (ii) The six factors are: Moral stability, Ego-strength, Super-ego strength, Spontaneity, Friendliness and Hostility -guilt Complex.

Check Your Progress 2

- (i) a) Amoral type b) Expedient type c) Conforming type d) irrational-conscientious type and e) national-altruistic type.
- (ii) It is the process where measurements on a large number of behaviour traits are taken of a large number of individuals. The inter-correlation among these variables is computed and then cluster of traits or sets of symptoms are identified.
- (iii) The rational-altruistic individual is considered at the highest level of character development. Persons possessing this level of character development have a set of appropriate internalised moral principles, but these internalised values constitute an open rather than a closed system.

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